This paper focuses on efficiency measures of banks from six countries in East Asia. We use a two-stage approach to study the post-crisis period 1999-2004. We first estimate technical efficiencies using Data Envelopment Analysis and test for cross country differences. Efficiency scores are relatively high for South Korea and relatively low for the Philippines. We then investigate the link between ownership structure and efficiency controlling for various factors such as size, risk and the economic environment. We find that efficiency scores are higher for banks which are held by minority private shareholders and banks that are foreign-owned.
Introduction
The financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997 raised various issues regarding the efficiency and the safety of local banking industries. After the crisis, bank regulators implemented several measures to reform the banking system with the aim of providing efficient banking services to the economy on a sustainable basis (Garcia, 1997) . First, some governments decided to avoid closure of distressed banks by recapitalizing them. This process was accompanied by changes in management, ownership and governance. Second, Asian governments also avoided closure of banks by encouraging or even forcing safe banks to merge with distressed banks (Hawkins and Turner, 1999; Hawkins and Mihaljek, Gelos and Roldós, 2001; . This consolidation process contributed to restore the financial viability of distressed banks even if it is not clear whether merging a weak bank and a strong bank, can actually create a strong bank (Hawkins and Turner, 1999) . However, such interventions could still be more cost-effective than a government bailout or takeover. Third, Asian governments have facilitated the access of foreign investors in order to import international best practice and technological benefits (Choi and Clovutivat, 2004) . Finally, many other restructuring processes were also implemented such as the replacement of underperforming bank managers and revision of managerial incentives. This bank restructuring programme, which began almost immediately after the crisis in 1997 and which lasted until the early 2000s, modified the ownership structure and the governance of banks. This paper investigates the implications of such policies on the efficiency of commercial banks in East Asia during the post-crisis period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The countries examined in this paper are Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Except for Hong Kong, all these financial systems have long been dominated by commercial banks with extensive branch network which have been the most affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Laeven, 1999) . Drake et al. (2006) however note that banks in Hong Kong also sharply suffered during the Asian financial crisis in [1997] [1998] as it coincided with a local property market crash resulting in depressed profits and increased bad debts. Hence, the common experience of the six countries is a unique feature to assess the implications of the restructuring process that took place after the crisis.
Previous studies on emerging countries which have analyzed the impact of restructuring programs on bank efficiency do not provide conclusive results. Papers which have studied the relationship between foreign bank entry and efficiency in transition countries find mixed results (Claessens et al., 2001; Fries and Taci, 2002; Bonin et al., 2005) . Unite and hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013 Sullivan (2003) show that foreign entry in the banking market in the Philippines corresponds to an improvement in operating efficiencies, but with a deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios. The studies which examine the link between bank ownership and efficiency, especially in transition economies, also provide mixed results (Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Yildrim and Philippatos, 2002; Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005) . For Asian countries, Laeven (1999) examines the risk factors and efficiency of banks using Data Envelopment Analysis, applied to the pre-crisis period 1992-1996 to predict which banks were restructured after the crisis of 1997. His findings show that state-owned and foreign-owned banks as well as Korean and Malaysian banks took little risk relative to other banks, while family-owned and company-owned banks and Indonesian and Philippine banks were among the highest risk takers. Williams and Nguyen (2005) focus on the link between bank performance and governance for five East Asian countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) between 1990 and 2003. Their findings show that, as a result of bank privatization programs, banks selected for domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) exhibited relatively low rank order profit efficiency before the governance change, which improved in the short term but deteriorated in the long-term implying a temporary efficiency gain. Their results suggest that the benefits of domestic M&As are realized in terms of technical developments, which determine productivity rather than managerial performance. They also find a considerable improvement in rank order technical change and productivity in the short term after M&As, which was maintained in the long-term. On the whole their conclusions tend to support bank privatization and reject state ownership although their findings suggest that the potential benefits of foreign ownership may take a long time to be realized. This paper extends the existing literature in three directions. First, the paper tests whether banks perform differently across countries during the post crisis period to focus on the implications of the restructuring process in the region. Our data therefore cover the 1999-2004 period. Second, we use a more detailed breakdown of bank ownership than in previous studies (that is state-owned, foreign-owned, private-owned, institutional investor-owned and widely-held). Third, two efficiency measures -technical efficiency and efficiency of revenue creation -are investigated in relation to bank characteristics such as ownership structure measures, size, risk indicators and environmental variables. We hence focus on efficiency measures consistent for institutions mainly involved in traditional intermediation activities (loans and deposits) but also on measures which capture more accurately expanded bank activities such as the provision of services (commission-and fee-based) and trading activities.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to compute efficiency scores, as well as our dataset and the obtained results. Section 3 investigates the determinants of efficiency scores and section 4 concludes.
Efficiency estimates

Method
In this study, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with variable returns to scale (VRS) to compute efficiency scores. The choice of VRS over constant return to scale (CRS) is justified on the grounds that not all decision-making units (DMUs) are operating at an optimal scale due to imperfect competition and financial constraints. As we assume variable returns to scale, we can use two approaches to measure efficiency: the input-oriented (input minimization) approach and the output-oriented (revenue model) approach 1 . These two models will estimate exactly the same frontier and then by definition will identify the same set of efficient DMUs. But these two models will differ for the efficiency measures associated with the inefficient DMUs.
We use the intermediation approach in both input-oriented and output-oriented models. The intermediation approach, originally proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) , is appropriate when banks operate as independent entities 2 (Bos and Kool, 2006) . Moreover, the intermediation approach which takes interest expenses into account may be more appropriate to evaluate financial institutions as they represent in general at least half of total costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) .
In the input-oriented model (Model 1), we assume that the main role of banks is to distribute funds between depositors and borrowers at the lowest costs. We therefore consider as inputs personnel expenses, interest expenses and other operating expenses, and as outputs net loans, total securities and other earning assets. We follow Hughes, Mester and Moon (2000) and assume that interest is an input (expense), which is consistent with the input minimization objective of Model 1. Total securities include equity investments by the banks while other earning assets include physical property and premises that are used in revenue generation like safekeeping transactions. The specification of Model 1 is as follows:
1 The input-oriented model and the output oriented-model provide the same value of efficiency scores under CRS but not when assuming VRS. 2 On the contrary, studies which consider bank branch efficiencies use the production approach.
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where θ is the inefficiency score, x ij and y ij are the amount of the i th input consumed and the amount of the r th output generated by the j th bank, respectively. The index n refers to number of bank observations, m equals the three inputs (personnel expenses, interest expenses and other operating expenses) and s refers to the three outputs (net loans, total securities and other earning assets).
As non-traditional bank activities, such as commission-and fee-based activities and trading activities have become more important, the exclusion of these items may bias efficiency measures (Berger and Mester, 1997) . We use Model 2, which is an output maximization problem, to account for bank activity diversification. We follow Sturn and Williams (2004 Williams ( , 2006 and Avkirian (1999 Avkirian ( , 2000 by considering the interest expenses and the non interest expenses as inputs and the net interest income and the non interest income as outputs. Model 2 is specified as follows: number of bank observations, m equals the two inputs (interest expenses and non interest expenses) and s refers to the two outputs (net interest income and non interest income).
Data
The dataset used in this study contains bank-year observations (see Table A1 In our study, we code the ownership structure based on the stockholder information contained in the BankScope database. For banks with missing information, we have looked at the individual bank's websites to determine the appropriate classification. Majority ownership is defined as owning over 33% of the stockholders' equity, following Laeven (1999) . We consider a more detailed breakdown of bank ownership than in previous studies. We examine similar ownership forms as in Laeven (1999) 
Results
Model 1 (Equation 1) and Model 2 (Equation 2
) are used to calculate technical efficiency, denoted respectively TE1 and TE2 5 . The technical efficiency scores we obtain are displayed in Table 1 , as well as the technical efficiency scores from CRS (CRSTE1 and CRSTE2) and the technical efficiency scores from VRS (VRSTE1 and VRSTE2) used to calculate TE1 and
We use a Spearman rank test to compare the efficiency scores computed with Equation 1 and Equation 2. We find a Spearman correlation coefficient greater than 0.95. The null hypothesis of independency of each measure of efficiency is therefore rejected. In other words, banks with a higher level of efficiency obtained with Model 1 are also those exhibiting a higher level of efficiency with Model 2. We therefore do not find different results when computing efficiency scores with Model 1, which mainly considers traditional banking activities, and Model 2 which considers both traditional and non-traditional banking activities. 4 Among the 80 banks in our sample, none was classified into two categories of ownership simultaneously. Otherwise, we would have deleted such banks from our sample. 5 We use the DEAP Version 2.1 Computer Program by Tim Coelli to solve the linear programming problem. 6 TE1 is equal to the ratio of CSRTE1 to VRSTE1 and TE2 is equal to the ratio of CSRTE2 to VRSTE2. The literature distinguishes efficient banks as those exhibiting constant returns to scale and inefficient banks as those exhibiting variable (increasing and decreasing) returns to scale.
The results highlight differences in the number of observations with increasing and decreasing returns to scale when we use an input oriented model (Model 1) or an output oriented model (Model 2).
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We find that 49 and 18 observations respectively exhibit constant returns to scale for We find the D statistic to be 0.9472 and 0.9797 respectively for TE1 (Model 1) and TE2 (Model 2), with a corresponding p value of 0.000, indicating a highly significant difference between the groups (see Table 2 ). To check for robustness, we also test the efficient group against the two inefficient subgroups separately, and find the D statistics close to 1 with p values close to 0 for both Models 1 and 2, indicating highly significant differences in the efficiency scores. The KS test is a robust test that only focuses on the relative distribution of the data.
Hence the value of the D statistic is not affected by scale changes. In Figure 1 in the appendix, we can see that the KS percentile plot of the sets of efficiency scores is strikingly distinct. The efficient (CRS) scores plot are scrunched as a vertical line on the far right side of the graph while the inefficiency scores (IRS and DRS) appear as upwardly diagonal, indicating that on the whole, the efficiency scores are not likely to be normally nor log-normally distributed. 7 We also check if technical efficiency scores are different across countries. We use the pair-wise KS test. In general, the results suggest that there exist differences in technical 7 Percentile plot is a better estimate of the distribution function and the use of probability scales allows us to see how normal the data are. Normally distributed and log-normal data will plot as a straight line on probabilityscaled and probability-log scaled axes, respectively. The KS tests reported that the datasets on efficiency scores are unlikely to be normally or log normally (exponentially) distributed, hence the generality that the datasets are non-parametric and distribution free. This justifies the choice of the D statistic over the Student's t test in determining the differences between groups of banks.
efficiency scores of banks across the six Asian countries under study (see Table 3 ). Indonesia and the Philippines reach the lowest average technical efficiency scores (Tables 2 and 3), both for Models 1 and 2. This result is consistent with Kwan's (2003) To further investigate the relationship between bank efficiency and ownership, the efficiency scores generated from Equations 1 and 2 are used as dependent variables in multiple regressions to determine if bank characteristics and country-specific environmental variables can explain differences in efficiency.
Determinants of efficiency scores
Regression analysis
To investigate the factors that might explain differences in efficiency levels, we focus on the ownership structure of banks along with a number of control variables such as bank size, leverage and asset risk. Total assets is used as a proxy for bank size. We also introduce the ratio of equity to total assets to capture the quality of bank management and risk preferences. We expect a negative coefficient as well-capitalized banks reflect both a higher management quality and a higher aversion to risk taking. These banks should be more cost efficient in producing banking outputs. We further include the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans as a proxy of output quality. The literature provides mixed results on the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable. The coefficient can be negative if banks spend more resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring, and consequently fewer problem loans at the expense of higher operating costs (Mester, 1996) . The coefficient of this variable can be positive if banks have high ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans, indicating poor loan hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013 quality that calls for higher operating costs related to credit risk and loan loss management (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
We also consider another measure of output quality, which is the standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA). This broader measure of asset risk might be more appropriate for
Model 1 where we consider as outputs not only net loans but also total securities and other earning assets. This measure of risk should also be applicable for Model 2 which accounts for traditional and non-traditional banking activities.
Regarding our ownership structure variables, we build five different dummy variables referring to the nature of ownership. We consider that there is a majority ownership when an owner holds at least 33% of the stockholders' equity. As the owners are classified in five categories, we create the following five dummy variables which takes the value of one when ownership is at least equal to 33% of the equity and 0 otherwise: state-owned, foreign-owned, private-owned, institutional investor-owned and widely-held. The different types of bank ownership refer to different forms of governance as discussed in Berger et al. (2005) . Studies of U.S. corporations typically use the governance term to refer to the methods shareholders use to reduce managerial agency cost, such as board composition, voting rules, or stakes by managers. Ownership is assumed to be related to a bank's performance because the incentives for managers to efficiently allocate resources might differ under different ownership types or arrangements.
We then estimate the following cross-section equations to determine which factors are efficiency drivers: Because the efficiency scores generated by DEA models are dependant on each other, we use bootstrap estimators to calculate standard errors of our estimates (Xue and Harker, 1999; Casu and Molyneux, 2003) . The DEA efficiency score is not an absolute efficiency index, but a relative efficiency score. The assumption of independence within the sample is therefore violated and conventional OLS is invalid. The results throughout this paper are obtained from 10 000 bootstrap iterations. The estimation results are displayed in Table 5 .
hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013 Regarding efficiency as measured in Model 1, we find that total assets, as a proxy for size, significantly and positively influences technical efficiency. Large banks are on average more efficient than smaller banks if we consider the input minimization model, which is consistent with Kwan (2006) and Drake et al. (2006) . We also find a significant negative sign for the equity to total assets variable, but only at the 10% level. The coefficient associated with the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans is not significant and therefore loan quality does not seem to alter efficiency. However, the coefficient of the broader measure of asset risk (standard deviation of ROA) is positive and significant, though at the 10% level only.
Regarding the ownership structure variables, only the "widely-held" variable is significant and positively related to technical efficiency.
In the case of Model 2, bank size (total assets) has a negative significant coefficient.
Unlike in Model 1, this result indicates that small banks are less efficient than large banks. In Model 2, inputs and output measures are revenue focused. It is therefore expected that Model 2 might yield different results because efficiency estimates are sensitive to input and output specification (Berger et al, 1993) . The coefficient associated to the equity to total assets variable is not significant. As such, there appears to be no relationship between the degree of leverage and efficiency. We also find that the variable "foreign-owned" has a significant and hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013 positive impact on bank revenue creation efficiency. The results from Model 2 also confirm that banks which are held by minority private shareholders ("widely-held") have higher efficiency scores.
Robustness checks and discussion of results
We check the robustness of our results by considering environmental variables as determinants of efficiency scores. The objective of incorporating such variables is to associate variation in bank performance with variation in the exogenous variables characterizing the environment in which bank production and intermediation occurs. The exogenous variables influence performance not by influencing efficiency, with which they are assumed to be uncorrelated, but by influencing the structure of the technical and cost efficient frontier. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) underline three categories of environmental variables that influence cost efficiency as a guide for cross-country studies: i) those that describe the main macroeconomic conditions which determine the banking product demand characteristics; ii) the variables that describe the structure and regulation of the banking industry, and; iii) those that characterize the accessibility of banking services.
In this study, we account for macroeconomic conditions by including the real GDP growth rate (GDP) as in Pastor (1999) 9 which falls under the first category as prescribed by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) . We also introduce the difference between the loans and savings deposit interest rates (SPREAD) as a proxy for the structure and competition in the different national banking systems. A smaller gap between the loans and savings rates suggests a more competitive environment. Finally, we introduce the coefficient of variation of the country's exchange rate with respect to the US dollar (FOREX), which should capture the volatility of the local currency.
We find that environmental variables are on the whole not significant (see Table A3 in Appendix). The only significant variable is GDP with a positive influence on technical efficiency, when considering Model 1 (TE1) with the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans taken as a proxy of output quality. Our results therefore highlight that the factors that influence efficiency do not depend on the economic environment. Regarding the ownership structure variables, our results remain the same. We find that the variable "foreign-owned" has a significant and positive impact on bank efficiency but only for revenue creation efficiency (TE2), as previously. Our results also show that "widely-held" variable is significant and positively related to technical efficiency, but only at the 10% when considering TE2.
The results of our econometric investigation show that the differences in efficiency scores cannot be explained by the economic environment but can be explained by bank specific characteristics, namely ownership arrangements. We find that the relationship with size is positive and significant when we consider an input minimization objective (Model 1) and negative when we consider revenue creation (Model 2). We do not find a strong relationship between bank leverage and efficiency levels, and loan quality does not appear to determine efficiency levels. To a lesser extent, risk taking is a significant and positive driver of technical efficiency when an input minimization objective is considered.
Regarding the ownership structure, we find that banks which are held by minority shareholders exhibit higher levels of efficiency over the post-crisis period. This result is not consistent with the findings of Laeven (1999) showing that widely-owned banks experienced a decrease in efficiency relatively to other banks across the Asian region during the period 1992-1996. Based on the same ownership definition as proposed by Laeven (1999) , our results highlight that for the post-crisis period, Asian banks which do not exhibit a concentrated ownership have higher efficiency levels. Therefore, our findings do not support the hypothesis of a positive impact of concentration on efficiency. We also find that foreignowned banks are more efficient than other domestic banks when we consider revenue creation. This is consistent with Laeven (1999) who highlights that foreign-banks showed an increase in efficiency relative to other banks.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the implications of the restructuring process imposed on banking industries in Southeast Asia after the 1997 financial crisis. Within a regional approach involving six countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) we find that Asian banks generally benefit from increasing returns after the crisis period. However, we observe persistent differences in efficiencies across countries. Efficiency scores are relatively high for South Korea and relatively low for
Thailand and the Philippines. The results of our econometric investigation show that such differences can be explained by bank specific characteristics. Efficiency is driven by bank hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013 size and to a lesser extent by risk taking. Our main findings, which are robust, are that banks owned by minority private shareholders and by foreign investors appear to be more efficient than other banks during the post-crisis period. Therefore, unlike some studies that report a positive effect of ownership concentration on efficiency in the same region during the precrisis period (Laeven (1999) , our results suggest that reforms aiming to improve corporate governance might currently be beneficial to minority shareholders. Our second result regarding the role of foreign investors is consistent with previous studies. Hence, our findings imply that the entry and growing involvement of foreign investors is still beneficial for the efficiency of the banking industry in this region. Thailand  Total  1999  15  0  10  18  12  3  58  2000  11  0  13  15  11  4  54  2001  8  12  12  16  11  6  65  2002  8  12  12  15  10  6  63  2003  8  12  12  13  9  6  60  2004  8  12  12  13  7  6  58  Total  58  48  71  90  60  31  358 hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013 01, p<0.05, and p<0.10 , respectively. TE1 and TE2 are respectively technical efficiency from model 1 (input minimization) and model 2 (revenue model). Foreign-owned, institutional investor-owned, state-owned, and widely-held are dummy variables. GDP= real GDP growth rate; FOREX= coefficient of variation of the country's exhange rate measured in US dollars; SPREAD = difference between loan and saving deposit interest rate. hal-00915134, version 1 -9 Dec 2013
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